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Abstract 
In July 2016, a Gender Recognition Act (GRA) was implemented in Norway which 
allows one to change legal gender (male/female) without the previously required 
sterilisation. Though this move by the Norwegian state has been widely celebrated by 
trans rights advocates for its progressive approach to gender recognition, the Act’s 
limitation to the male/female binary and the lack of concurrent improvement in trans-
specific medical access raise concerns about how far-reaching and transformative it 
actually is. Given the diversity of trans experiences and identities, this article seeks to 
address the following question: in what ways is the Act on gender recognition capable 
of empowering those who change legal gender, and in what ways can it prove limiting 
or detrimental? To answer this, I conducted interviews with twelve individuals who 
changed their legal gender soon after the Act’s implementation. Applying Thematic 
Analysis to the interviews, I uncover and analyse moments of empowerment and 
disempowerment in order to explore the potential of legal gender recognition to shape 
one’s personhood and citizenship in the Norwegian context. 
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In July 2016, a Gender Recognition Act (GRA) was implemented in Norway, allowing 
people to change legal gender from male to female or vice versa without undergoing 
the previously required diagnosis and sterilisation. For many trans people, their 
identity documentation and personal number could finally reflect their personal 
gender identity. The new Act has been celebrated in the queer community, both locally 
and abroad, since it enables the long-sought after right to determine one’s own legal 
gender. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, have 
pronounced it a breakthrough law, given its relatively progressive approach of 
forgoing the requirement of any medical authorisation and permitting children as 
young as seven years to take advantage of it (Amnesty International 2016, para. 11). 
The GRA holds much potential in shifting the landscape of trans rights, in the sense 
that it ruptures the conventional and seemingly inalterable alignment between the 
sexed body and gender identity, leading to a significant advancement in socio-
political understandings of not only trans people, but of gender and sex as social 
organising concepts in general.  
 
However, while many can (and do) benefit from the right to change legal 
gender without sterilisation, the GRA’s parameters largely reflect normative beliefs 
about how gender operates. Namely, it only allows one to choose within the binary of 
male/female. It furthermore does not come with improvement in access to medical 
technologies for those who desire it, as had been recommended by the expert 
committee (Norwegian Directorate of Health 2015, pp. 174-175),2 precluding many 
from achieving crucial self-transformation. These limitations discredit the myriad 
ways that gender materialises through and on the body as well as neglect the complex 
interplay of social and legal recognition. Therefore, for those who do not fit the gender 
binary or ‘pass’ (to be socially recognised as one’s gender), they are not only excluded 
 
2 Following a 2013 report on Norway-based trans lives and experiences (‘Alskens folk: Levekår, 
livssituasjon og livskvalitet for personer med kjønnsidentitets-tematikk’, by Janneke van der Ros), an 
expert committee was appointed by the Norwegian Health Directorate (Helsedirektoratet) to 
investigate the Norwegian state’s parameters for changing one’s legal gender and the services 
available around trans-specific healthcare. It also developed recommendations on how the practices 
of that time could be improved. The findings and recommendations were published by the 
Norwegian Health Directorate (2015) in the report, ‘Rett til rett kjønn – helse til alle kjønn: utredning 
av vilkår for endring av juridisk kjønn og organisering av helsetjenester for personer som opplever 
kjønnsinkongruens og kjønnsdysfori’ [The right to the right gender – health for all genders: 
investigation of the conditions for changing legal gender and organising health services for people 
who experience gender incongruence and gender dysphoria]. 
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in great part from the Act’s reach, but they can also experience further marginalisation 
as they fall outside the boundaries of what makes one the ‘right’ kind of trans person.  
 
This is not to say that those for whom the GRA was ostensibly intended – 
namely, trans people – can be simply divided into ‘benefiting’ and ‘not benefiting’ 
from the new Act. Gender-specific needs and desires vary widely and are always in 
flux. The Act’s impact on those who use it is not uniform; rather, as it is dependent on 
circumstance, it results in a diversity of consequences for one’s identity development. 
This variability in experience became evident in my data collection, whereby I 
conducted in-depth interviews soon after the Act’s implementation with twelve adults 
who had changed legal gender under the new Act. In analysing these interviews, two 
overarching themes emerged in how experiences were characterised, namely as 
resulting in empowerment and disempowerment. Each participant described 
experiencing moments of each during their processes of changing legal gender and in 
the early stages of living with this new gender marker. The following text will explore 
these moments through Thematic Analysis, as developed by feminist psychologists 
Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke (2006), in order to better understand how legal 




Since 1979, only those who had undergone the state-controlled process of sex change 
(from the diagnosis of transsexualism (F64.0 in the ICD3) to irreversible sterilisation) 
could change their legal gender in the state registry system (Sørlie 2015, p. 360). For 
many who identify as trans,4 this proved rather problematic. This is because the state 
 
3 The diagnosis of ‘transsexualism’ (F.64.0 in ICD-10, the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems, which is the WHO’s medical classification text) is the first 
requirement to be considered for trans-specific medical treatment (Rett til rett kjønn 2015, p. vi). In 
ICD-10, ‘transsexualism’ fell under the diagnosis category group, Gender Identity Disorder, which 
was in the section ‘Mental, Behavioral and Neurodevelopmental disorders’. However, with the 
development of ICD-11 in 2018, the designation has been changed to ‘gender incongruence’ and 
moved from the mental disorders category over to ‘Conditions related to sexual health’. ICD-11 will 
be put into force from 1 January 2022 in the WHO member states, including Norway (WHO 2019). 
4 The term ‘trans’ is a tricky one since, like other identity markers, it is uncontainable and porous. In 
this article, I use trans as an all-encompassing term for those who do not experience their gender as 
aligned with that which was assigned at birth. This can be an on-going, periodic or temporary 
experience. However, not all those who meet these criteria identify as trans. Many use other terms, as 
will be seen later in this article, when I introduce the interview participants. I therefore try to be 
careful about how I use trans when describing those whom I speak about, as it runs the risk of 
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held, and continues to hold, a monopoly over access to this process. Only one hospital 
in the country, University Hospital (‘Rikshospitalet’) in Oslo, offers such medical 
treatment at their National Transsexualism Treatment Centre (NBTS). Of all those 
who apply, only 25%-50% of applicants are eventually diagnosed with transsexualism 
and provided treatment; it can take up to eight years to complete the process (from 
diagnosis to sterilisation); and no second opinions or extensive private options are 
possible for those who are denied treatment (van der Ros 2017, p. 125; Amnesty 2014, 
pp. 71-74). Moreover, many patients of NBTS report the centre as often seeming 
unaware of or unconcerned for the diversity of trans experiences, a particular setback 
for those who do not fit the ‘typical’ transsexual format (i.e. ‘trapped in the wrong 
body’ from a young age) and therefore are likely turned away (van der Ros 2017, pp. 
136-137; Amnesty 2014, pp. 72-73). The state’s understanding of transsexualism seems 
to hinge on a life-long self-identification within the gender binary and an adherence 
to gender norms in self-presentation and expression.  
 
For this reason, the trans communities in Norway and abroad had much to 
celebrate when the state’s medical system no longer could dictate who was allowed to 
change legal gender. To finally be able to ‘self-determine’ was deemed a monumental 
achievement, since it indicated the state’s acknowledgment of trans people as being 
capable of both governing their own bodies and knowing best their own gender 
identity. The popularity and accessibility of the new Act is reflected in its use – about 
400 people took advantage of it in the eighteen months following its implementation 
(E. Duurhuus, personal communication, January 23, 2017). On the other hand, only 
500 underwent the process of sterilisation in the near half century since it became a 
requirement for legal gender change in 19795 (van der Ros 2017).  
 
The new Act on gender recognition did not come easily. It was long rallied for 
by local and international trans rights advocates, as the slow response by the 
Norwegian state to the potential issues of enforced sterilisation evoked intense 
criticism from human rights organisations. Namely, in early 2013, Amnesty 
 
imposing a false coherency between all those who are or seem to be categorizable as trans. Variations 
of trans experiences are vast and cannot be readily reduced in any meaningful way. However, in an 
effort to speak about the GRA’s impact on trans people, there are at time implied reductions as I 
attend to the issue of how gender continues to be normatively conceptualised through the GRA, 
thereby precluding trans subjectivities from materialising beyond otherness.  
5 Sterilisation became available in 1962 but could not result in legal gender change until 1979 when 
the Norwegian Tax Administration established the practice of permitting legal gender change 
following confirmation from the Oslo University Hospital that a patient has undergone a ‘real sex 
conversion’ (Amnesty 2014, pp. 70-71, 75). 
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International criticised the requirements as ‘cruel, inhumane and degrading’ 
(Amnesty 2013, p. 1). That year, the Norwegian Directorate of Health responded to 
calls for redress by forming an expert committee to assess the situation. In 2015, in 
accordance with the standards set forth by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Council of Europe 1950), specifically Article 8 (right to privacy) and Article 14 
(right to protection from discrimination), the expert committee stated its opinion that 
the sterilisation requirement was contrary to human rights, and it recommended the 
development of a law allowing for gender self-declaration. A Bill followed that same 
year,6 then Lovvedtak 71 (2015-2016), the new Act on gender recognition (Lov om 
endring av juridisk kjønn), was passed in July 2016. The Act states its central provision 
as the following: ‘People who are residents of Norway and who experience belonging 
to the other gender than they are registered in the National Registry have the right to 
change their juridical gender’ (Lov om endring av juridisk kjønn [Law on legal gender 
change] §2; my translation).  
 
There are few requirements to change legal gender, aside from residency and 
age. One must have residency status (be a temporary or permanent citizen) and be 
sixteen years or older (Lov om endring av juridisk kjønn §2 and §4). Children from 
seven years of age must have consent from both parents or, in the case that the parents 
do not agree, from the court; children who are six years or younger and born with 
uncertain somatic sex development can change legal gender with medical 
documentation from health personnel (Lov om endring av juridisk kjønn §4). 
Contrary to the requirements of many other states which have enacted similar Acts, 
such as Sweden,7 in Norway there is no requirement for a confirmation letter from an 
authority, such as doctor or psychologist, in order to change gender. The change is 
also immediate, because there is no latency period imposed between the request and 
the new gender status’ issuance, such as in Denmark8 where a six-month wait is 
required. Moreover, an unusual twist is that Norway does not have a limit to how 
many times one can change legal gender (unlike in, for example, the UK9). 
 
The new gender status is acquired by issuing a request online to the tax office, 
then confirming the request by signing and returning a paper form – a process which 
typically takes only a few weeks (Lov om endring av juridisk kjønn §5). With the new 
 
6 Prop. 74 L (2015–2016) Lov om endring av juridisk kjønn [Proposition to the Storting (bill): Law on 
legal gender change] 
7 See Sweden’s Gender Recognition Act of 2013 
8 See Denmark’s Gender Recognition Act of 2014 
9 See UK’s Gender Recognition Act of 2004 
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legal gender, one is assigned a new personal identification number, the ninth digit of 
which denotes male (odd number) or female (even), and new identification 
documents are issued accordingly. In the state registration system, one’s gender status 
is adjusted, so that in every situation which requires formal identification, one is 
officially listed with their new gender marker.  
 
Given the diversity of gender identities and experiences, and the vast array of 
accompanying needs and desires, it is not immediately evident how having a new 
legal gender marker impacts on one’s sense of self as a gendered subject. In what ways 
can it empower the person to feel more secure, visible and capable? In what ways does 
it undermine one’s process of gender identity development, and why? How do these 
experiences speak to the way that gender is interpreted and applied in the GRA, 
specifically when it regards trans identities and lives? In this article, I will address 
these queries through an analysis of twelve interviews conducted with individuals 




During the initial analysis of the interview data, I investigated how the law both 
benefited and disadvantaged its users. I found that this became particularly evident 
in how the interview participants reflected on the shifts in their everyday lives 
following changing legal gender, namely in how empowered they felt. The ways in 
which they described and made sense of these feelings invoked for me many questions 
about the power of legal recognition. Given the feedback by some participants on how 
vulnerable they continued to feel, I became especially interested in its limited capacity 
to compensate for the lack of social recognition. In order to address the complex social 
and legal interplay which underpins trans identity construction, I chose to employ a 
transfeminist approach. This approach integrates critical legal theory focussed on 
trans rights to examine how Norway’s Act on gender recognition may operate to 
designate value to non-normatively gendered or sexed bodies based on historically-
sanctioned ideas and practices (Sharpe 2002). At the foundation of transfeminism, 
diverse gendered experiences are examined against the backdrop of compounding 
structural oppressions in order to elucidate the processes through which gender 
identities emerge and are shaped (Garriga-López 2019). Doing so opens the analysis 
to ‘the material conditions of trans people’s lives and their means of daily survival’ 
(Garriga-López 2019, p. 1621), allowing for a meaningful investigation into how 
Norway’s GRA has impacted upon those who have taken advantage of the Act. It can 
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offer a more holistic understanding of how legal recognition intersects with social 
recognition in forming personal experiences, thus maintaining space for considering 




To begin, it is imperative to describe what I mean by empowerment. In its classical 
form, empowerment could be defined as increased autonomy, self-determination, 
security, and control over one’s self and surroundings (Cruikshank 1999). However, 
while this continues to be the most common application, it can sever the term from its 
foundation of power (Cruikshank 1999), obscuring the structural dynamics at play. 
This is typical of neoliberalist perspectives on the self. Since the 1980s, there has been 
in the global West increasing cultural fixation on self-actualisation and taking 
responsibility for one’s own life circumstances (Rushing 2016). Such highly 
individualised autonomy is reflected in the feminist movement of the 1980s and 90s, 
whereby the mentality was often that women’s empowerment hinged on the ability 
to make choices about one’s life and body, especially where contrary to patriarchal 
tradition (Brown 2005). The ‘turn lemons into lemonade’ version of empowerment is 
useful only to a certain degree when considering how legal recognition shapes 
subjectivities, as its overreliance on individualist values forfeits sufficient 
consideration of how social structures open and close possible choices (Rushing 2016, 
n.p.). Varying circumstances greatly determine what boundaries can be crossed; while 
agency is key to laying trajectories of self-development, context cannot be overlooked.  
 
Nonetheless, although empowerment is imbued with liberalist impressions of 
what makes a person capable to make certain choices, it still proves helpful in 
evaluating the impact of legal recognition (Rushing 2016). Empowerment, in this text’s 
application, is conditioned not only upon the perceived possibility of making claims 
to self-fulfilling resources, practices and involvements, but also upon the futurity of 
self-sustainability and continued growth. With this usage, the concept captures the 
juncture of the internal experience of the individual with the arrangement of social 
elements in the individual’s everyday life. It recognises the advancement of autonomy 
whilst accounting for the significance of external factors in fostering such autonomy 
(Deveaux 1994, p. 234). This approach can be fruitful in illustrating the complexity of 
experienced empowerment as it pertains to how precarity can be abated. 
Disempowerment, on the other hand, indicates increased precarity, wherein one’s 
livelihood becomes challenged and one struggles to flourish (see Butler 2009).  




Identity & recognition 
 
In understanding the potential of legal recognition to empower or disempower an 
individual, it is useful to apply recognition theory. To begin, relative to most 
subjugated groups, legal recognition is for trans people perhaps markedly 
underscored in the push for equality. Most groups struggle for some mix of 
recognition and redistribution (access to resources) (Fraser 1995), but trans people’s 
struggle in Norway tends to be driven even more so by recognition politics.10 This is 
in large part because Norway, as subsumable under the Nordic Model, prioritises 
egalitarianism in cultural values and state practices. The state emphasises its role in 
protecting its citizens; the high level of trust the citizens have in the state renders the 
state’s recognition more valuable in the Nordic region relative to contexts which are 
not social welfare based (Delhey and Newton 2005). The social welfare state 
guarantees that if in some way it is failing its duty, then citizens can reasonably expect 
its concerns will be heard and solutions will be offered (Delhey and Newton 2005). To 
have one’s needs ignored, therefore, is to have one’s citizenship devalued. In being 
given the power to ‘self-determine’ one’s own gender, the individual is regarded as 
capable of self-governing, a key aspect of rational humanity (van den Brink and Owen 
2007).  
 
Trans subjectivities are, in this way, inextricably linked to the legal recognition 
of their personal gender identity. The state’s acknowledgment of one’s identity 
through its formalisation signals to society that it is valid (Mayeda 2009; Girschick 
2008). Without this acknowledgment, one can experience oppression through erasure 
(Taylor 1994, p. 25), as one’s humanity and thus right to dignity are brought into 
question (Marshall 2014). Without the state’s confirmation of one’s identity, one’s 
belonging to society can feel challenged. Fellow social actors are inclined to regard 
non-legally recognised identities without sufficient respect, and the resultant abjection 
(Phillips 2014) transforms one’s sense of self through an internalisation of one’s own 
abnormality or monstrosity (Sharpe 2002, 2007; Foucault 1974-1975/1999). Living in 
the margins of society and the law can undermine a person’s stability and trust in a 
liveable future, particularly when this is compounded by social ostracisation. At the 
 
10 Of course, there are claims to redistribution for many trans people, since access to materials (via job 
and housing security) can become jeopardised. However, this issue is significantly allayed by the 
state’s comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, Lovvedtak 93 (2012-2013), the Sexual 
Orientation Anti-Discrimination Act. 
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margin, one's viability is challenged, and recovery requires a materialisation of self 
through recognition by others (Butler 2006). Recognition in all its forms, therefore, is 
crucial to selfhood; legal recognition plays a critical role in confirming the internal and 
social value of trans individuals. The extent of its role is illustrated in the interviews 
analysed below, in which I investigate the ways in which legal recognition of gender 
identity can shape gendered subjectivities. 
 




This article’s analysis and discussion draw on interviews I conducted with twelve 
individuals in October and November of 2016, whereby I sought to explore the 
experiences each person had in changing legal gender without undergoing the 
previously required sterilisation. The individuals were all aged eighteen years and 
older, and all but two were Norwegian-born; the other two were either becoming or 
had recently become Norwegian citizens. The participants ranged greatly in identity 
(as indicated in the Analysis and Discussion section). The names provided are 
pseudonyms. All the interviews were conducted in person, with the exception of one 
(Anders), which was conducted over an online chat at his request. Furthermore, they 
were all conducted in English, as agreed to beforehand; no one took advantage of the 
offer for a translator to assist us. I note the use of English because none of the 
participants speak English as a first language, a factor which I kept in mind when 
conducting and analysing the interviews11.  
 
The interviews were semi-structured, in order to both address key points as 
well as allow for a more natural flow of conversation (Kvale 2009). They lasted 
between thirty-five minutes and just over an hour, and they were conducted in a 
location chosen by the participant – most were in their home or a public place near 
their home. It was important that all the participants felt comfortable and safe with 
me.  
 
11 In each interview, I strove to ensure we understood each other’s questions and responses through 
repetition and clarification, as to avoid as much as possible imposing false interpretations. In 
analysing the data, I chose methods which allowed for broader analytical approaches – namely 
looking more at overall content of the narratives than specific terminological usage (which could be 
problematic as some terms do not easily translate).  




I interviewed the participants several months after the GRA’s implementation, 
and all the participants had changed their legal gender; some had done so 
immediately after the Act’s implementation and others over the few months 
following. Therefore, while the experience of changing legal gender was still fresh on 
their minds, some time had passed thus giving them a glimpse into how life is with a 
new gender marker. The questions I asked centred on their experiences of living in 
Norway as a trans person (or however they identified – which I asked in the beginning 
in order to ensure I used the right terminology throughout the interview). I asked 
them to explain why they have decided to change legal gender, what the process was 
like, and how it compared to what they had imagined it. I wanted to understand in 
what ways their senses of self and behaviour had shifted, in order to detect how the 
gender marker change had impressed upon their relationship with their body, other 
people, the state and their own futures. To encourage each participant to share what 
felt most relevant to them, rather than restrict the explored topics, I kept my questions 
to a minimum and gave more space for sharing narratives in whatever form felt most 
appropriate. However, in order to ensure we covered all the key points I had planned 





My methodological approach to analysing the interviews is based on Thematic 
Analysis (TA), specifically the version developed by feminist psychologists Virginia 
Braun and Victoria Clarke. They define TA as ‘a method for identifying, analysing and 
reporting patterns (themes) within data’ (2006, p. 79), stating that it is a ‘specific 
approach in its own right’ rather than merely supplementary (2006, p. 78).  
 
In addressing the benefits and limitations of legal gender recognition, TA 
proves fruitful in locating and tying together the different ways in which the 
participants report their legal gender change experiences. Notably, it allowed for me 
to find distinctive moments within each interview; no participant had a uniform or 
linear experience following their change. For each person, there were multiple – 
sometimes even conflicting – emotional impacts that transformed their sense of self. 
The analysis therefore reflects the array of themes rather than of participants.  
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Furthermore, the TA method I employ below is ‘contextualist’ (Braun and 
Clarke 2006, p. 81), as it seeks to recognise both how the participants create meanings 
from their experiences and how the meanings of the experiences are informed by 
larger social contexts. It is a complexly dynamic process of agential and social forces 
that produces an individual’s emotional response to an event. Analysing the interview 
data through this method allows for a rich discussion about both the participants’ 
modes of sense-making and the contextual background that has provided the tools for 
this process. 
 
I conducted the analysis with the specific question of the limitations and 
benefits of legal gender recognition. This guided my coding – I searched for moments 
in the interviews that answered the question, which I grouped together on a 
‘mindmap’ in order to organise the moments thematically (Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 
89). The key themes I distinguished were ‘empowerment’ and ‘disempowerment’. 
Each has two subthemes: ‘validation’ and ‘security’ for the former, and ‘still 
misrecognised by society’ and ‘not recognised by the state’ for the latter.  
 




1. Validation  
 
Many participants describe their experience of legal recognition as validating. For 
them, the state’s acknowledgement verifies their personal gender identity as being 
real and thus worthy of formalisation. I interpret this as individual empowerment, as 
one feels seen as capable of making such an important decision about their own fate, 
rather than relying on the confirmation of the medical institution (i.e. the state 
hospital). As a reciprocal process, recognition strengthens the bond between the 
subject and the state. Anders (early 20s) sums this up: 
Changing my gender marker made me feel safer, accepted and free! Most of all, 
it made me feel validated. I felt the government no longer [believed] they knew 
who I am better than me. They realised that I am the only one who gets to say 
who or what I am. I was given back sovereignty over my own body. (…) My self-
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esteem has grown exponentially, and my trust in the Norwegian government 
and society has increased. 
Since Anders has not yet made a decision about what changes he would like to have 
made to his body, the option to forgo sterilisation and still be legally male is 
particularly important. By maintaining an ‘in-betweenness’, he resists conforming to 
social standards on gender identity and rather enacts his subjectivity (Nordmarken 
2014). The right to self-determine confers on him a detectable degree of dignity – he 
indicates feeling valued by the state as a self-governing subject.  
 
Similarly, validation can help one to feel authenticated and more genuine. This 
genuineness is not experienced just with oneself, but with friends and family, and 
society at large. Bente (early 60s) emphasises her need to be open and honest with 
people in her life, after many years of hiding herself due to shame. Her former 
employment required she travel a lot, and during these times away she secretly 
explored her feminine side. Eventually this hiding took a toll on her emotional health, 
however. She became severely depressed, and she decided she had to leave her wife 
and move to another town to start her life again. Bente’s request for medical assistance 
by the state has been rejected, so legal recognition has been significant as it has allowed 
her to begin being more honest to herself and others. She now feels she has permission 
to claim a space as a woman:   
I feel [changing my gender] is right because I’ve been lying to myself and I’ve 
been lying to all the others all my life. And now I don’t feel the meaning of lying 
anymore.  
Though Bente’s body has not changed, the authority of the state to certify her 
femininity has proven sufficient in many ways to make her feel as though she can be 
respected her the person she identifies as. Likewise, Dolores (late 50s), who has been 
living as a woman since 2005, has found harmony within herself: 
It was a huge milestone for me. (...) When I opened this envelope from the state 
which said, ‘You are a woman’, it was a special time for me. A special experience 
for me, to get this recognition. To say, ‘Yes, now I am’. (...) Something was fitting. 
The pieces were just fitting. (...) It was just the recognition — now I am official as 
what I have always been. I have the state’s signature, so I don’t have to prove 
anything anymore. e 
This echoes Judith Butler’s writing on recognition, whereby the ‘I’ requires a ‘you’ to 
survive and flourish (Butler 2004, pp. 43-44). For Dolores, it was not enough to believe 
within herself, without the corroboration by another authority, that she is a woman. 
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Until it was confirmed by someone or something outside of herself, her sense of self 
was still in ‘pieces’. The state plays an essential role in sanctioning the identities of its 
constituents through its discourse, such as via its pronouncement of one’s gender 
(McBride 2013). The letter of confirmation Dolores received marked a transition from 




Though similar in meaning, I distinguish in this text between validation and security, 
as the latter does not only point to internal feelings, but also to changes in behaviour. 
Security becomes evident in participants’ discussions on increases in confidence or 
audacity, particularly regarding doing things that were previously avoided out of fear 
of social admonition.  
 
Returning to Dolores (late 50s), the validation she feels after receiving a 
confirmation of legal gender change has helped her to express herself more freely and 
creatively. For her, the new legal status buffers her against the risks of not being 
socially regarded as female, and she no longer feels pressured to compensate for her 
lack of femininity: 
[When I got my new number], I wasn’t expecting that I was going to start to 
accept my masculinity so much. I wasn’t expecting it. (...) I’m more comfortable 
with doing male things. Driving a tractor. Car painting, welding, mechanical 
work. (...) Somehow, I [had before] not recognised the male parts of my, should 
I say, mental or psyche or whatever, in the way that I do now. (...) I don’t have 
to prove these female things anymore because I am [a woman now]. (...) I don’t 
have to protect myself from the world this way anymore. (...) I don’t have to walk 
around in a lot of feminine attire to prove myself. I don’t have to wear a lot of 
makeup or anything. It just fits. 
By saying that ‘it just fits’, Dolores is highlighting a closure in the gap between the 
woman she wants to be and the person she felt she was. Legal recognition has 
compensated to a significant degree for her lack of passing and self-acceptance, as it 
has made her feel more emboldened to take on traditionally masculine tasks that she 
had enjoyed before feeling they must be given up in order to satisfy feminine 
standards. 
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Forgoing gendered standards is possible because legal recognition can instil 
courage. Ana (late 30s) shares a similar emotional response in regards to feeling more 
secure and audacious. Referring to her legal status as her ‘superhero cape’, Ana feels 
she can be more authoritative with people now. Thanks to her ‘papers’ (letter of 
gender change confirmation), she is protected from those who question her gender 
identity, which often happens on the phone due to her self-described ‘low voice’. She 
tells me that she no longer needs to worry about this, because she feels more certain 
of herself:  
I’m happy when people [such as telemarketers] are calling. Now they will get a 
[personal identification] number that says ‘woman’. It won’t say ‘man’. So, if 
they have a problem with me, this is my identity. If you have a problem with my 
voice, it’s your problem. (…) When I get phoned by a seller, if they don’t believe 
it’s me because of my voice, I just hang up. But before, it was like I got really mad 
or I got really sad, I got really angry. (…) Now I have the papers, so what can 
they say? (…) I know who I am. I have my legal [status] and I have stability.  
The role of the public via social (mis)recognition has diminished due to being legally 
categorised as desired. For Ana, this instils stability, as the dissonance between her 
body and her womanhood is no longer as pronounced.  
 
Such protection through legal recognition can materialise differently for those 
who ‘pass’ (to be socially regarded as one’s personal gender identity) most or all the 
time. Silje (early 30s), who experiences passing nearly always as a woman, is relieved 
to not be ‘outed’ anymore by her personal identification number. She also got a new 
birth certificate, in order to make sure all her identity documents reflect her new 
status. In this way, Silje is able to reorient her personal history to one which appears 
more typically feminine, aligning her with socially conventional interpretations of 
gender as life-long and impermeable. She describes finally being able to be a ‘regular 
woman’: 
Sometimes, you get hired somewhere, then they can see your personal number. 
And when travelling [or] if I go to the hospital or something, they mostly look at 
what [my ID] says about me, and they don’t need to know that I am transgender. 
And I can just be a regular woman. It’s like, people don’t need to know!  
Feeling more secure can also come in the form of being able to self-protect. Camilla 
(late 20s) has experienced a great deal of discrimination from her family, work and, 
most notably, the state’s welfare services (NAV), the latter of which has rejected her 
appeals for support based on presumably being psychologically unstable. When 
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Camilla became legally female, it made her feel like a ‘born girl’ and ‘more like a real 
woman inside’, and thus more capable of defending her livelihood: 
I feel stronger as a legal woman to stand against [NAV]. I stand stronger in my 
beliefs and my rights as a person. So, if the welfare service will try something, I 
feel stronger to go against them, to keep my rights and to put them more in place, 
to get them to listen.  
The focus on ‘rights’ and standing up for herself demonstrates a heightened sense of 
agency to determine her life course – a key factor in legal recognition’s capacity to 
empower an individual. As can be seen in Silje’s testimony, empowerment can come 
in the form of being able to control one’s environment more and to take up the space 
necessary to ensure a better life.   
 
Similarly, when asked what he had expected to see changing in his life with a 
new legal gender, Jørgen (late teens) says: 
I saw what I see today, that I am a dude. I have the right, somewhat right, to 
genitalia and parts inside my body and such. And that I have a quiet and normal 
life as the dude I was meant to be. And that I have chosen this to be happy and 
free, not to be a slave to society. (…) I can [now] say that legally I am a dude, not 
just in theory. 
Jørgen’s repeated use of the American slang ‘dude’ is significant, as it denotes a type 
of guy who is sufficiently (or highly) masculine. He yearns to be unquestionably 
manly. It is interesting to note, however, that he later showed me the trans pride 
necklace he wears every day and clarified that he does not want to hide his past. 
Though a seeming contradiction, perhaps this openness is part of his desire to not be 
‘a slave to society’, to not give in to the pressure of cisgender pretence.  
 
Though wanting to ‘pass’ as a woman or man does not always mean hiding 
one’s transness, to not have to justify one’s gender marker in everyday situations can 
endow one with security. Torill (early 60s), who is openly trans and reports passing 
completely as a woman, is glad to not have to explain herself when she goes to the 
pharmacy or post office: 
You get tired of it. You get outed [as transgender] all the time. But now, this 
doesn’t happen anymore. (…) [Having my new legal gender] is already making 
me secure in every situation. And, if people have some doubts when I tell them 
this is me, it’s no problem. It’s a good feeling, that’s all I can say. It’s the way it 
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always should be, right? It’s easier, my life has become easier. And I am more 
secure when I go out. I feel fine, all the way through. 
This sentiment is echoed by Thea (mid 20s), who explains that she feels more 
courageous to walk through the women’s locker room on the way to the pool, despite 
not always passing: 
I know that in my bag I have my bank card with a number that says ‘female’, so 
if anyone stops and screams at me, I know that I legally have every right to be 
here. 
This points to her awareness that it can be a rather problematic situation when in such 
an intimate space as a changing room, which is why she did not decide to take the risk 
before. However, she interprets the state’s recognition as granting permission to enter 
these cordoned spaces, since the state’s word would, in her mind, prove more 
powerful than that of other social actors should she be questioned. As will be explored 
below, however, the state’s word does not always protect one from sociocultural 




The new Act on gender change also poses a number of significant limitations. Almost 
all the participants describe situations in which they felt legal recognition does not 
empower them significantly. They experience that in many ways it does not address 
trans marginalisation as effectively as it should or as they expect it to. First, despite an 
implicit promise by the welfare state that social attitudes will be effectively influenced 
by the state’s legislation, the Act does not necessarily protect trans people from 
misrecognition in the meantime. Moreover, some participants expressed frustration 
or disappointment that their new legal status does not satisfactorily reflect their 
experiences or needs. 
 
1. Still not recognised by society 
 
A common concern raised by the participants was that of still encountering social 
misrecognition. This was particularly an issue in regards to more intimate spaces such 
as locker rooms and toilets. This could be expected given that social standards around 
bodily sex have only shifted marginally in the wake of the Act, and many individuals’ 
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bodies do not appear normatively-constructed, due to the continued restriction on 
access to gender-confirming medical treatment or, for some, a lack of desire for bodily 
transformation. Despite Thea’s (mid 20s) excitement that she now has the ‘right 
number, the right letter’ and could finally walk through the women’s locker room to 
the pool (as noted above), she still does not change clothes amongst other women or 
swim in the pool since she feels her body still appears too masculine. She does not 
want to ‘out’ herself, as she worries the form of her body will do. Ana (late 30s) makes 
a similar point. Despite her boost in confidence, she clarifies that getting the ‘paper’ 
(stating she is legally a woman) does not mean she can act like a woman in every sense: 
I [still] wouldn’t go to a women’s shower because I am still in the [physical 
transition] process. Just because I have the number…doesn’t give me a right to 
be in front of other girls with something between my legs. To me, I would feel 
like it’s rude. (…) When I am finished [the physical transition process] and am 
the way I should be, should have been born like, then I can do the things I 
wouldn’t have done before. Because…then you’re not going to be seen as a 
weirdo, or like, ‘Look, she has a penis’. When I’m finished, I’m going to be 
comfortable with myself, and then, yeah, I can do what every woman can do. 
And, like I said, it’s not that a paper gives you everything. It gives you a lot, it 
gives you confidence, but you’re still in the process.  
Bente (early 60s) also struggles with her lack of physical transformation, a decision 
made for her by NBTS’s refusal to treat her. Though she is thrilled to have the right 
marker, she notes that legal change does not make her a ‘true’ woman on its own: 
When I stand at the mirror, just before I take off my clothes, I see myself as a 
woman. (…) I feel I’m a woman, but as long as I don’t get the hormones or the 
surgery, I feel like a transgender. (…) I am not quite yet who I am, the person I 
should have been.  
Bente conveys that she is stuck in this transgender state, an in-between place that 
underlines her incompleteness. It is this incompleteness that leaves her feeling 
vulnerable, which is made clear when she tells me that even though she knows she 
has the right to use the women’s bathroom, she still looks for the handicapped toilet 
instead. Unlike Thea’s conviction that showing her personal identification would 
rescue her from an uncomfortable encounter, Bente does not feel protected by her legal 
status. Moreover, Bente seeks to escape the trans identity as much as possible, whereas 
Thea expresses pride in her non-normativity. This is perhaps in part owed to a 
difference in experiences due to age – Thea, being in her mid 20s, has come to 
understand her trans identity in a more radical era than has Bente (early 60s), as the 
last few decades have witnessed an increasingly open public discourse when it comes 
to LGBT issues.  




Even though Lene (early 30s) feels she passes as a woman fulltime, she also 
does not feel secure to use this public women’s bathroom. She explains that legal 
rights are not enough to counteract the potential harassment: 
[My legal gender] really is like a paper thing, which consolidates my legal rights. 
(…) Legal rights do not exactly translate into social rights. (…) I’m worried 
about…the social implications of getting into 'gender trouble' or getting into 
‘gender confusion trouble’, in the bathroom or some situation where people 
might question your gender.  
The participants’ demonstrated fear of crossing into the other gender’s realm 
resonates with a concept coined by trans studies scholar, Talia Mae Bettcher: ‘reality 
enforcement’ (2014). This concept describes the phenomenon of a trans person being 
continually reminded of their non-normality through a constant threat of exposure, 
lending to a persistent pressure to hide any inconsistency between perceived gender 
identity and bodily sex (i.e. genitalia). To be uncovered as a ‘gender deceiver’ or 
‘gender pretender’ (Bettcher 2006) is terrifying for many trans people. One’s personal 
gender identity can be invalidated through social derision or fear. The state’s 
recognition may relieve some of the resulting discomfort, but it cannot fully 
compensate for one’s perceived ‘failure’ to perform a gender identity properly, 
particularly when this failure is seen as being due to having a wrongly constructed 
body. 
 
Though a present experience for most, fear of exposure can be heightened for 
male-to-female trans people (primarily in the Western context), given social fears 
around men objectifying women’s bodies, as well the stronger tendency for those 
appearing as effeminate men to be denigrated than those appearing as masculine 
women. For transmen or those otherwise masculine-identifying, this fear is less likely 
to manifest, given the relatively more relaxed social mores around gender. This is 
evidenced by Jørgen’s (late teens) remarks that he feels ‘insecure’ about his chest, since 
he has not had a mastectomy yet, but still is confident enough to swim topless at the 
pool and change in the men’s room.  
 
Next, Dolores (late 50s) and Evelyn (early 30s) both discuss the fact that their 
legal marker has not gained them more social recognition. Though Dolores reports 
feeling validated, as presented in the previous section, she also continues to feel 
misrecognised by her work colleagues after changing legal gender: 
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They can’t see this big woman with a dark voice [as having] a lot of knowledge 
and competency that she can use in her work. (...) [I keep] meeting a kind of wall 
and a kind of non-understanding. (...) I’m still not recognised as a competent co-
worker.  
Dolores’ experience of being discredited in her capacity to work efficiently due to 
being trans has not been mitigated by the state’s recognition of her female status, 
which may be in part due to the fact that her colleagues had known her for some time 
before she changed legal gender. Their minds were already set, and, in any case, the 
stigmas attached to being trans, particularly to transwomen, are often of a social 
nature more than legal. This is indicative of the slow transition social values and ideas 
take to adapt to the new realities sculpted by legislation.  
 
For Evelyn, changing her legal name and starting hormone therapy were self-
verifying experiences, as these affected everyday situations more intensively. Legal 
gender change, for her, has not proven comparably empowering: 
In terms of rights, I don’t think the legal gender changes anything about how 
society sees us. It really doesn’t. It’s just a number, and very few people know 
it’s the third to last number. (…) It doesn’t really change much. For me it doesn’t 
change anything. Aside from more [bureaucratic] problems. 
Much of Evelyn’s focus during the interview was on practical issues that came with 
obtaining new identification cards, since she was at the time also finalising the process 
of becoming a Norwegian citizen. Focussing so much on the pragmatic side, rather 
than on any internal shifts, highlights the ambivalence she feels about being legally 
recognised. It perhaps points to an unspoken frustration that she must have to go 
through this process at all in order to have the correct gender marker, as it is a process 
only necessary for those who were previously misidentified.  
 
2. Misrecognised by the state 
 
Another common concern raised is that the Act obligates people to identify within the 
gender binary, whether or not one personally identifies as such. It would be an easy 
assumption that trans people who take advantage of the Act do identify as male or 
female whilst those who do not change gender must identify outside the binary. 
However, it is this assumption which some of my participants found to be 
problematic. Lene (early 30s) remarks on her frustration with the process: 
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I don’t really believe in that system, in the gender binary system. (…) I don’t 
appreciate having the gender binary ideals forced onto me. [It] does not 
represent reality at all. (…) Gender doesn’t really matter, biologically or socially. 
It’s just ridiculous. Socially it’s just a simple way of classifying yourself, as one 
or the other. 
Lene tells me that she has changed her legal marker to ‘female’ for ‘practical reasons’, 
since in the eyes of the public, she appears female. This is a result of years of hormone 
treatment, and she is pleased with the way it makes her body feel. She does not wish 
to have gender-confirming surgeries, however, and she finds herself consequently 
excluded from many women’s spaces. Furthermore, Lene’s lack of personal 
transformation following legal gender change stems from her view that the Act is not 
really helping break down gender norms so much as ‘bureaucratising people’s 
bodies’. A Sharpe refers to this as ‘re-sexing the body through law’, a process intended 
to ‘accommodate transgender people with the existing gender order’ (2002, p. 57). 
Thus, rather than feeling recognised by the state, Lene feels the pressure to adjust her 
legal marker to what is most convenient for society at large. She is no freer to express 
her gender identity now than she was before. She tells me that had she had the option, 
she would have chosen a third gender, or no gender at all.  
 
Thomas (mid 20s) also experiences the legal gender as unnecessarily 
bureaucratic and unreflective of how gender identity really is. Though he is happy to 
finally have a gender marker which matches his sense of self, he is irritated by the fact 
that the state was able to legalise gender self-determination and implement it into the 
registry system so easily. He wonders why this was not done sooner, and why it is so 
easy that ‘any person’ can do it (since there is no transsexualism diagnosis 
requirement). For him, it demeans the struggle trans people have long endured: 
I’ve been going through this [process at NBTS] for so many years and then all of 
a sudden you could just fill out a form and just change your gender. So, I guess 
it is a sort of frustrating that it is suddenly so available and easily obtainable. (…) 
[When I got it], I didn’t feel anything. It was like we say in Norwegian, ‘det skulle 
bare mangle’ [‘it is finally as it should have been’]. It was so normal for me, I 
guess. Like, yeah, what else is new? I needed this way before, you know, because 
I’m a male. I should have had this. 
For Evelyn, Lene and Thomas, the new Act does not suggest that trans people are 
being respected more by the state. Therefore, they do not draw significant personal 
empowerment from changing legal gender since they do not feel the state is 
necessarily conferring recognition of their personal identities (or their individual 
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agencies) so much as restructuring its organisation of people’s bodies. The guarantee 




The interview participants present a broad array of how changing legal gender has 
impacted upon their lives. On the one hand, it becomes evident that legal gender 
recognition can empower the individual through validation and security. Many 
participants report feeling protected by their new legal status when entering gender-
segregated spaces or being misgendered by others. Having ‘the papers’ (the state’s 
letter of gender change confirmation) can provide a buffer between the individual and 
others, as it signals to others that the individual’s gender identity deserves 
recognition. This proves particularly significant in the case when the individual’s 
body does not align with conventional bodily sex forms, as is the case for all those I 
interviewed, since they had not undergone gender-confirming surgeries. 
Furthermore, for the individual, the right to self-determine one’s gender identity 
acknowledges one’s agential capacity and societal value.  
 
On the other hand, legal recognition of one’s gender may fail to mitigate one’s 
experience of misidentification. If an individual does not identify within the binary, 
or if they are not witnessing changes in how they are regarded and respected, then 
identification papers will not necessarily aid them in making their claims. 
Additionally, the state’s slow process of developing the Act and its narrow parameters 
indicate to some that their needs for recognition and dignity are secondary to those 
who are normatively gendered. It can lead to disappointment and decreased trust in 
society and the state, as well as internal turmoil as one continues to feel excluded from 
society.  
 
The resulting impacts are necessarily various and shifting. A central point 
made in this article is that one’s experience of gender self-determination is diverse – 
one can feel both ‘empowered’ and ‘disempowered’ by legal recognition. As 
demonstrated in the analysis, many of the participants lauded the Act for improving 
their life quality whilst speaking of feeling that the lack of bodily transformation left 
them at risk of being outed or unable to participate fully in the women’s or men’s 
realm. Others reported finding many everyday events easier to navigate but 
ultimately misrepresented by the gender binary. These mixed experiences may point 
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to the issue of trans experiences (or indeed all gender experiences) being 
misunderstood to some degree. The state’s role in constructing gendered subjectivities 
may be overemphasised while society’s role is underemphasised. Trans identities, in 
this way, are treated as stable and governable, which obfuscates the continual process 
of bodily re-inscription across contexts and time. To be sure, such reductivity may be 
inevitable, as the legal category of gender requires the collapsing of nuanced 
expressions and embodiments into a singular, containable format. Any Act regulating 
gender identity would arguably prove exclusionary for some experiences, 
embodiments and expressions. That which breaches conventional norms and 
expectations the most is perhaps at greatest risk of falling outside the beneficial realm 
of legal gender recognition. As discussed above, moments of disempowerment were 
stronger in relation to not ‘passing’ as one’s personally-identified gender as well as 
feeling compelled to fit a gender dichotomy.  
 
Nonetheless, despite its shortcomings, Norway’s Gender Recognition Act 
offers a significant departure from the long-held conventions around bodily-
sex/gender-identity dyad, in that it opens up possibilities of performing gender in 
ways not previously conceivable under the state’s law. It ruptures societal perceptions 
of gender identity as it challenges both traditional social investments in 
predetermined gendered self-identification as well as the medico-legal foundation 
that has served as justification for governing the trans body through enforced 
sterilisation. There still remains, it goes without saying, a substantial amount of work 
to be done before trans people can be said to be free in any meaningful sense. It is 
therefore imperative that there is ongoing critical investigation into the impact of legal 
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